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Section I: Introduction 
Does the exchange rate regime matter for international trade? 
This question was never asked in international economics before the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods System in 1973. Under that system currencies were pegged to the US dollar 
while the dollar was pegged to gold. Since the collapse, exchange rate regimes are a major 
issue for countries and they have had to make the decision on what kind of exchange rate 
regime they will implement.  
Exchange rate regimes are important for countries because the exchange rate itself is 
important. It is the relative price of two monies in which each money has a couple of key 
roles. The first is that the money is a store of value. But the money also has to be able to be 
used for different market transactions like purchasing commodities, lending to a borrower 
and debt repayments to a creditor. In order to purchase goods from a foreign country, the 
domestic country must use the foreign currency to complete the transaction (Helpman, 1981).  
Choosing an exchange rate regime is an important decision for every country and one 
that should be well thought out. Unlike before Bretton Woods where there was only one 
choice for a regime, countries now have a wide variety of regimes to choose from. Choices 
range from fixed regimes such as dollarization, monetary union, currency boards, hard pegs 
and crawling pegs to flexible regimes such as bands, managed floats and pure floats. 
Although it is difficult to know which exchange rate regime is appropriate for each country, 
and no one regime will work for every country at one time, it is necessary to understand how 
the various types of regimes affect industrial, emerging and developing economies. 
Macroeconomic performance can also depend on the type of exchange rate regime 
that is being implemented. Two important macroeconomic targets that can be affected by the 
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exchange rate regime are inflation and growth. Fixed exchange rates have been associated 
with lower inflation and more monetary discipline from a central bank; however the 
relationship between fixed exchange rates and higher output growth is not as strong. It also 
has been argued that the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and adoption of flexible 
exchange rates has led to a decrease in international trade due to the higher volatility 
associated with them (Dellas, 1993). 
So far, most research surrounding exchange rate regimes have been empirical studies 
about how inflation, growth and exchange rate volatility affect international trade. There have 
not been as many studies looking at how the regime itself can affect trading between two 
countries. The empirical studies most relevant to this research have been done by Rose 
(2000), who just measured the impact of currency unions on bilateral trade. Klein and 
Shambaugh (2005) also conducted research just on fixed exchange rates and trade. The 
emphasis of this research is concerns- how much do alternative exchange rate regimes matter 
for international trade?  It will show that the exchange rate regime does matter for trade 
whether it is a fixed or flexible regime. Exchange rate volatility is also an important factor 
and will also be measured because the type of regime can affect volatility which as a result 
can have an effect on bilateral trade. 
This study uses the gravity model to estimate and determine how much of a difference 
the type of regime makes regarding international trade. It begins with a baseline estimation 
excluding an exchange rate regime dummy variable as well as fixed effects estimation for the 
baseline. Following the baseline estimations, an estimation of the full gravity model including 
a dummy variable for the exchange rate regime is performed and also run fixed effects 
estimation on the full model. To account for any endogeneity, an instrumental variable 
estimation where exchange rate volatility is instrumented with inflation is used.  
5 | P a g e  
 
Section II includes a more in depth literature review, Section III will give a short 
history on exchange rate regimes during both the gold standard era and in the Bretton Woods 
System. Section IV explains the different types of regimes and a further breakdown of the 
benefits and drawbacks to each regime as well as classification approaches. Section V 
introduces the gravity model and how it works along with some of the inherent problems and 
how they should be addressed. Section VI is about the model used here and an explanation of 
the variables and a data summary, Section VII will discuss the results from each estimation as 
well as possible interpretations of the results, and finally the last Section VIII will give the 
concluding remarks.  
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Section II: Literature Review 
 
Many studies in the field of international economics involve exchange rate regimes 
and their impact on an economy. Most of these studies look at how macro performance is 
affected by the exchange rate regime. Alternative exchange rate regimes can have a 
significant impact on macro-economic indicators such as inflation, interest rates, exchange 
rate volatility and output growth as well as exchange rate regimes as shock absorbers.  
Much of the work on exchange rate regimes and the macro-economic indicators listed 
above has been done by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002). Together they have done a number 
of empirical studies. In short, they found that under fixed exchange rate regimes, inflation as 
well as interest rates is often lower than under flexible regimes. The relationship between 
output growth and alternative exchange rate regimes is not as clear because the exchange rate 
does not have a direct effect. Output growth varies across regime types. 
There have been many more empirical studies on exchange rate volatility under 
alternative exchange rate regimes and how international trade is affected by it. Flexible 
exchange rates are argued to have a higher volatility than a fixed regime. For example, 
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) find that exchange rate volatility is higher under flexible 
regimes, but this is seen as “noise”. Volatility can be lower for upper income countries using 
flexible regimes. For lower income countries, fixed regimes produce a reduced level of 
exchange rate volatility. Even though movements are much larger for low income countries, 
and since they offset inflation differentials, they reduce real exchange rate variability.  
In theory, a higher volatility of the exchange rate should depress trade flow, but the 
empirical evidence has come up with mixed conclusions. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) 
find that adopting a fixed exchange rate does not necessarily lead to more trade. In addition, 
Borda and Romalis (2003) find that the effects volatility has on trade are not as large as 
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previously thought. However, Arize, Osang and Slottje (2000) have found different results. 
They showed that for less developed countries, high exchange rate volatility has a significant 
negative effect on export demand in both the short and long run. 
There have also been many empirical studies on the effectiveness of exchange rate 
regimes as shock absorbers. Conclusions from these studies are mostly in agreement that the 
main benefit from implementing a flexible exchange rate regime is the ability to absorb terms 
of trade shocks. Borda (2001) and Edwards and Yeyati (2004) were both able to find support 
for this theory. 
One of the argued benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes is that there is more 
discipline and credibility. There is more discipline under a fixed regime because the central 
bank is committed to maintaining the parity. Because when a government decides to adopt a 
fixed regime, there is a level of commitment by their central bank that is required, giving the 
exchange rate credibility. However, discipline and credibility are not guaranteed under a 
fixed regime.  Many authors, including Tornell (1999), Bordo (2003) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983) have been able to make several arguments as to why discipline and credibility are not 
necessarily greater under a fixed regime. 
Fewer empirical studies have been done on how the exchange rate regime directly 
impacts trade flows. Rose (2000) made a study on how currency unions increased trade, 
especially when countries share the same currency. Klein and Shambaugh (2005) made a 
more general study on how fixed exchange rate regimes affect trade. They found that 
counties with a peg also trade more with all other countries, especially with the other 
countries they are pegged to.  
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Section III: A Short History 
Exchange rate regimes have changed a lot over the past 100 years. Before the Bretton 
Woods System, there was the Gold Standard, which lasted until 1914. Although there is no 
exact time when it started, but a global shift began in the late 1800’s. The popularity of the 
gold standard was due to a few different aspects. Mainly, there was no other regime that was 
better than the gold standard during this time. The gold standard enjoyed a lot of credibility, 
mostly because there was no competing policy objective against the fixed rate.  
Miners in 1896 made a huge discovery in the Klondike gold fields that amplified the 
world gold stocks, which consequently eased deflationary pressures that were caused by the 
demonetization of sliver. The costs of the deflationary pressures were able to be reduced 
because of the downward flexibility of prices and wages. 
During this time period, the benefits of having global standards for measurements was 
becoming more apparent, so naturally having a gold standard soon followed. But there were 
standard rules that countries had to follow. Eventually volatility was increasing more and 
more, which affected terms of trade. By 1927, the gold standard was revised, but did that not 
last because monetary policy did not focus just on maintaining the fixed rate, but also had to 
achieve an “internal balance” (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002).  
By the 1940’s, discussions headed by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter about a 
post war international monetary system were an effort to finance reconstruction after the war, 
as well as promote free trade.  Finally in 1944, the Bretton Woods Agreement was 
culminated. By this time, the importance of having a stable monetary system was well 
understood and for the first time, the “rules of the game” were created. These rules of the 
game were the first fully negotiated monetary order to establish and govern rules for 
commercial and financial relations. 
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 A compromise had to be reached as there were disagreements on not whether to have 
a fixed or flexible exchange rate, but rather to what degree. The Americans were in favor of a 
hard peg because they would most likely be the major creditor and wanted the certainty of a 
fixed rate. While Europeans were hesitant to have a completely flexible exchange rate, they 
did not want to return to a hard peg like in the Gold Standard. Eventually a compromise was 
reached. The compromise was a system of adjustable pegs. This new system also led to the 
creation of the IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, now 
known as the World Bank.  
Problems with the Bretton Woods System started when the global gold coverage ratio 
began to decline and there was an unequal distribution of reserves. As a result, direct gold 
convertibility was no longer possible. So a new agreement had to be reached where 
currencies were pegged to the US dollar and the dollar was pegged to gold at $35 equal to 1 
ounces (about 992 grams) of gold.  
As successful as the Bretton Woods System was, there were two major flaws that led 
to the ultimate collapse. The first major flaw was that the growth of the reserves that was 
needed to finance world trade was dependent on the US balance of payment deficits. The 
problem with that was US policy was in no way tied to the world’s monetary needs. 
Secondly, confidence in the system’s reserve asset began to decline because the amount of 
dollars needed to cover global needs for reserves relative to the unchanged US gold reserves 
caused the decrease in the amount of gold coverage. There was little pressure for deficit 
countries to adjust their policies and no pressure at all for surplus countries, unless there was 
a crisis. Therefore, delayed and asymmetric adjustment returned (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 
2002).  
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As time went on, the US became more relaxed on polices. There were attempts to 
agree on how adjustments were to be carried out, but failed. The US dollar was becoming 
more overvalued and that needed to be resolved. A resolution was reached but did not last 
very long. On May 5, 1971, the Bundesbank had to stop purchasing dollars because within 
the first hour of trading, they received over $1 billion of inflows. Once the purchases of 
dollars were suspended, the Deutsche Mark was floating for the first time. Not long after, 
other major European currencies began to float. President Nixon closed the “gold window” 
on August 15, 1971 and ended the Bretton Woods System.  
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Section IV: Explanation of Exchange Rate Regimes 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, countries have a diverse choice of 
exchange rate regimes to choose from and it is a matter of the preferences of that country. 
Most industrial countries after the collapse decided to abandon the previous fixed exchange 
rate regimes in favor of a more flexible regime to allow their exchange rates to float freely. 
The whole international monetary landscape went through significant changes, but many 
developing countries still continued to keep fixed exchange rates (Edwards, 1991).  
Choosing an appropriate regime is never easy for any country. The rational choice 
really depends on the goals of that country and what the central bank can manage. The two 
main types of regimes in the broadest sense are a fixed exchange rate and a flexible exchange 
rate. With a fixed exchange rate, the domestic country fixes its currency to an anchor 
currency. The purchasing power parity condition implies that the inflation rate should be 
equal to the foreign rate of inflation. It also requires a strong commitment from the central 
bank to uphold the parity. Flexible exchange rates are determined by the market and have 
little or no intervention by the central bank, which is allowed to pursue an activist monetary 
policy. 
It basically comes down to a trade-off between reducing exchange rate volatility with 
a fixed regime or the central bank being able to have monetary policy with a flexible regime. 
Within this broad classification, there is a wide variety of exchange rate regimes, which are 
essentially a compromise the government tries to make for the impossible trinity in 
international economics; independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates and complete 
capital mobility (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002).  
Within the broad categorization of fixed exchange rate regimes includes the finer 
classification of regimes in order of degree of fixity: dollarization, currency boards, monetary 
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unions, traditional pegs and crawling pegs. In the category of flexible exchange rate regimes 
are bands, target zones, managed float and pure float.  
Crawling pegs, band and target zones can be considered an intermediate exchange 
regimes. The distinguishing characteristic between intermediate and fixed regimes is the 
commitment to a fixed rate. Within flexible regimes, the distinguishing characteristic 
between intermediate and completely flexible regimes is there is an explicit target zone that 
the central bank intervenes (Frankel, 2002). 
Table 4.1 summarizes each type of fixed exchange rate regime and Table 4.2 
summarizes the finer classification of flexible exchange rate regimes. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 
Regime Type Summary of the Regime 
Dollarization  
A country uses a major foreign currency as a legal tender, 
although it is possible that domestic coins are used. As a result, 
monetary policy is conducted through the anchor country. With 
dollarization, any positive return on the coins goes to the country 
issuing the anchor currency. 
   
Currency Boards  
The exchange rate of a local currency is pegged to an anchor 
currency. The regime and the parity of the exchange rate are bound by 
law which requires central banks to keep a minimum amount of 
international reserves that will insure a predetermined percentage of the 
monetary aggregate. With currency boards, any positive return on bank 
notes stays in the country.  
 
Monetary Union  
A common central bank issues a single currency to several 
countries in the same region. Any type of exchange rate policy can be 
implemented by the central bank but individual countries in the union 
cannot change or adjust the exchange rate parity. Monetary policy is 
carried out at a regional level and any positive return on the currency is 
shared by the countries in the union. 
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Traditional Peg  
There are two types of traditional pegs: a peg to a single 
currency and a peg to a basket of currencies.  
Peg to a single currency: A fixed exchange rate to a single 
anchor currency is maintained by the central bank trading at the 
announced par-value. The rate is normally adjustable through re-
evaluations in case there are disequilibria.  
Peg to a basket of currencies: A currency is fixed to two or 
more anchor currencies in which the basket may be chosen because of 
criteria that is specific to a particular country or could also be a 
composite currency. 
 
Crawling Peg  
The exchange rate of a currency is adjusted by predetermined 
rates. The currency can be fixed to a single currency or a basket of 
currencies. This type of regime is the most flexible of fixed regimes.  
 
 
Each of these exchange rate regimes in the finer classification shares many of the 
same benefits and drawbacks. To begin with comparison, the first main drawback to 
dollarization and currency boards, is that they are not able to easily adjust to external shocks 
through exchange rate movements, which can impose costs when the business cycles are not 
in sync. Secondly, countries implementing these types of regimes do not have the ability to 
set monetary policy according to their own objectives. The main benefit these two regimes 
share is that they both can reduce the time inconsistency problem and real exchange rate 
volatility which is subject to the perceived possibility of a new domestic currency or 
abandonment of the regime (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002).  
When member countries operating under a monetary union experience asymmetric 
shocks, they lose the ability to stabilize, which can be very costly depending on the 
availability and effectiveness of adjustment tools. However, monetary unions also have the 
main benefit is that the time inconsistency problem is reduced and exchange rate volatility is 
also reduced because an agreement on policy from all member countries is required (Ghosh, 
Gulde and Wolf, 2002). 
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 Both the single currency peg and the basket of currencies peg also provide the benefit 
on the reduction of the time inconsistency problem and exchange rate volatility through a 
commitment to an announced target.  Traditional pegs do not create any hard constraints on 
both monetary and fiscal policy which helps reduce the time inconsistency problem. Any 
large shocks to the economy can be absorbed by the ability to re-evaluate the currency; 
however, this capability leaves countries implementing a traditional peg vulnerable to 
speculative attacks. 
Of all of the exchange rate regimes classified under fixed, the crawling peg is the most 
flexible since it is a compromise of flexibility and stability. Crawling pegs are often popular 
among a number of countries that had a long trend of high inflation. The parity is decided day 
to day by taking the average rates determined by the market or adjusted according to the 
inflation rate differentials (Edwards, 1991). A divergence can occur between the actual rate 
and the parity within a band, and the parity would crawl in the same direction a flexible parity 
would crawl, although at a slower rate (Friedman, 1953). Because the exchange rate parity 
can be adjusted at a predetermined rate, the crawling peg is also vulnerable to speculative 
attacks (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002).  
One of the goals of hard pegs such as dollarization, currency boards and monetary 
unions is that a common currency is being established. The argument that the advantage of a 
single currency is that it encourages the integration of the local economy into a connected 
series of markets. These connected markets include the markets for goods and the factors of 
production. As a whole, fixed exchange rate regimes will help national economies integrate 
themselves into an international economy of connected markets (Friedman, 1953). 
Two additional arguments have been made against modern fixed exchange rates. The 
first argues that there is no central control over the amount of international money and the 
international monetary conditions like there was with the gold standard. At least with the gold 
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standard, the quantity of international monetary control was automatically implemented by 
the available amount of gold and its rate of growth (Friedman, 1953). 
The second argument against modern fixed exchange rates that there are a lot of 
barriers to trade including barriers to labor mobility (through immigration laws), capital 
movement barriers and tariffs to restrict the movement of goods. All of these barriers were 
created by some kind of government with their own protective objectives. But these types of 
barriers are not as harmful to an economy as the barriers to the mobility of goods and the 
factors of production. The fact that these harmful barriers even exists, suggests that 
governments operating under fixed exchange rate regimes may use the trade barrier variations 
to maintain the parity instead of adjustments to the purchasing power parity. When this is the 
case, then the argument that a fixed exchange rate regime promotes integration is 
contradicted (Friedman, 1953). 
Table 4.2: Summary of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
Regime Type 
 
Summary of Regime 
Cooperative 
Regimes 
            Central banks will cooperate with each other in order to the bilateral 
exchange rates of their currencies within a predetermined range. 
 
Target Zones 
and Bands 
 
The degree of flexibility is decided by the size of a band. 
Predetermined endpoints are set where the currency is allowed to fluctuate 
within the band. Intervention is also possible within the band to avoid 
pressure at the margins.  
 
Managed 
Float 
 
The exchange rate is allowed to move freely according to the supply 
and demand for the currency. Although the central bank is not bound to any 
rule or path, they can intervene when they feel it is necessary.  
 
Pure Float  
The exchange rate is allowed to move freely according to the supply 
and demand for the currency. There is very little or no intervention of the 
central bank as well as no restrictions for monetary policy.  
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When there is not a suitable device to adjust imbalanced payments quickly enough 
without causing required countries to re-evaluate their currency or reducing the central bank’s 
willingness to add credits to the international reserves, then the best device is more automatic 
flexibility of exchange rates (Friedman, 1953).  
Like with fixed exchange rate regime types, flexible regimes share a couple of the 
same drawbacks. One of the main drawbacks with cooperative regimes, target bands and 
managed floats is that there are no hard constraints on monetary or fiscal policy, which will 
not provide a complete solution for the time inconsistency problem. These types of regimes 
are also at risk for speculative attacks, but it is hard for private speculators to speculate the 
exchange rate under a flexible regime because there are no easy marks to go by (Friedman, 
1953). 
 The potential benefits for each type of flexible regime vary slightly. Since the 
introduction of flexible exchange rates, there has been a large demand for a regime that can 
achieve more automatic flexibility and keeping the advantages of the fixed exchange rate 
regimes. As a result, bands and target zones were devised (Friedman, 1953). Bands and target 
zones are the most restrictive regime out of the broad flexible classification. They allow for 
the exchange rate parity to be widened between one and five percent in both directions. 
Despite their mild restrictions, they still provide a limited role for exchange rate movements 
to absorb external shocks. Bands and target zones also encourage the development of a risk 
management system for exchange rates because there they only provide a partial expectations 
anchor; therefore there is still exchange rate uncertainty. 
External shocks can be absorbed through exchange rate movements, since pure floats 
are completely determined by market forces. There are no restrictions from the exchange rate 
regime on monetary policy. The main drawback to a pure float regime is that unless there is 
another institutional measure, time inconsistencies can still be a problem. A managed float 
17 | P a g e  
 
provides a way for market determined rates to be combined with a non-rule based 
intervention system to stabilize the exchange rate. Normally, a nominal anchor such as 
inflation is used to accompany a managed float (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 2002). 
But what is really important to understand about each type of exchange rate regime is 
how they can affect macroeconomic performance. Inflation, output growth, interest rates and 
exchange rate volatility can be affected by the type of regime a country is using. As a result, 
trade flows are affected. An understanding for the interrelationship between international 
trade and the forward exchange market is necessary for answering the question of how do 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes affect trade because of their uncertainty (Etheir, 
1973). 
Most economic convention tells us that fixed exchange rates both promotes output 
growth and international trade because of the reduced uncertainty of the exchange rate. They 
are also thought to keep inflation low because of more monetary discipline. On the other hand 
fixed exchange rates have also been argued to decrease output growth and international trade 
because they hamper price adjustments. They also have been argued to increase inflations 
because of the ability to burden future governments with the costs of “cheating” (Ghosh, 
Gulde and Wolf, 1997). Fixed exchange rates are also argued to not work as effective shock 
absorbers. 
In the next sections will discuss the theories on how the exchange rate regimes are 
argued to affect inflation and interest rates, exchange rate volatility, output growth, credibility 
and discipline and finally, shock absorbers. An understanding of these topics is important as 
they also have a direct effect on trade flows. 
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Exchange Rate Regimes: Inflation and Interest Rates 
There has always been a strong link between fixed exchange rate regimes and low 
inflation, possibly due to the discipline and confidence effect. The discipline effect works as 
an anti-inflation device for a couple of reasons.   
First, a fixed exchange rate cannot be maintained under large fiscal imbalances that 
are financed by increasing the money supply. International reserves will decline and there 
will be high appreciation of the currency if the domestic inflationary pressures rise above the 
international rate of inflation (Edwards, 1991). Any type of anti-inflationary policies 
however, may not be used to stabilize domestic prices, but to conform to the global price 
trend, which may not be stable, but either inflationary or disinflationary (Friedman, 1953).  
The second reason why the discipline effect works as an anti-inflation device is 
because the political costs of having ineffective monetary and fiscal policies can be too 
expensive. Inflation that is too high is often seen as undesirable for most countries. So there is 
an incentive for the central bank to keep inflation to a minimum. The confidence effect keeps 
inflation low because when the peg is credible, there is greater willingness to hold the 
domestic currency instead of spend it (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf,1996). 
Better inflation performance could be the result of slower money growth under the 
fixed exchange rate regime. As Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) showed that slower money 
growth is a cause, with scaled money growth being 3.5 percentage points lower per year than 
flexible regimes under de jure classification, which supports the hypothesis for the discipline 
effect. They also were able to show that inflation rates are generally lower under a fixed 
exchange rate regime given money growth. 
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Just because monetary discipline is better under fixed regimes, it does not always 
imply that fiscal discipline is as great. Countries can run up large debts without creating fears 
that the debts will be inflated away in the future.  
Endogeneity of the regime choice may cause a simultaneity bias of the exchange rate 
regime coefficient because although it has been shown that countries using fixed exchange 
rate regimes experience lower inflation, the decision to adopt a fixed regime is dependent on 
other economic or political factors. Countries that tend to have low inflation are more likely 
to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime. On average, not only do countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes have a lower inflation rate, but they also have lower inflation variability 
(Ghosh,Gulde and Wolf, 2002). 
The confidence effect associated with fixed exchange rate regimes increases the 
demand for domestic currency, which will be reveal lower circulation velocity and lower 
domestic interest rates. This is because, if expected inflation is lower under fixed regimes, 
and if the real interest rates are at least not much greater than under flexible exchange rate 
regimes, then the nominal interest rate should also be lower under fixed regimes.  
Changes in the nominal interest rates are a cause for concern because if they begin to 
decline, then that could mean a stronger demand for the domestic currency could follow. Real 
interests are often lower in a fixed exchange rate regime than in a flexible regime because the 
credibility granted by a fixed regime means a lower risk premium. This boost to a country’s 
confidence level will increase the demand for the domestic currency, which will result in a 
lower velocity of circulation and a quick reduction in the domestic nominal interest rates. If 
perfect credibility exists, inflation will fall to the world level, even countries that have a 
record of high inflation.  
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As Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1996) have shown, even though nominal interest 
rates have risen, the growth rate of the nominal interest rates for fixed regimes is 2 percent, 
while flexible regimes were at 6 percent. They also noted that for intermediate regimes, the 
growth rate of the nominal interest rate was the highest at 9 percent. Since the level of real 
interest rates can serve as a measure for confidence, they showed that the real interest rate for 
fixed regimes was 0.2 percent, while for flexible regimes was at 2.3 percent. Even though for 
nominal interest rates, the intermediate category was the highest, for the level of the real 
interest rate, it was lower than the flexible regime at 1.8 percent.  
Although inflation is higher under a flexible exchange rate regime, the consequences 
of it, such as a devalued currency and an increase in prices, are more transparent to the 
public. When the goal of a central bank is to keep inflation low, then there is pressure to 
avoid a crisis and create a policy to solve the problem (Friedman, 1953).  
Exchange Rate Regimes: Exchange Rate Volatility 
Since the collapse of Bretton Woods and the adoption of flexible exchange rate 
regimes in 1973, the relationship between the exchange rate uncertainty and international 
trade have been a popular research topic (Gagnon, 1993). It has been argued that flexible 
exchange rate regimes leads to lower trade because of the uncertainty associated with them. 
Most contracts for trade are not for an immediate delivery of goods, so there has to be a 
forward market. The high volatility of the exchange rate is costly for risk adverse traders and 
leads to less international trade (Arize, Osang and Slottje, 2000).  
Usually trade between two countries is denominated in the currency of either the 
importer or exporter; therefore any unforeseen changes in the exchange rate can result in a 
loss of profits (Dellas, 1993). This is because the price of the traded goods and exchange rate 
is agreed upon on the day the contract was made but payment is not received until delivery is 
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made in the future (Arize, Osang and Slottje, 2000). But since exchange rates are predicted to 
move slow and steady under a flexible regime, traders should not be too negatively affected. 
Even with adverse traders to exchange rate uncertainties, they still have the possibility to 
hedge their transactions through the forward exchange market. Any speculation or arbitrage 
between the spot rate and the forward market rate would make sure that expectations of 
appreciation or depreciation was revealed in the spot or forward rate. This would ensure the 
cost of the forward cover is within a reasonable limit (Friedman, 1953). 
It may seem trivial to say that the behavior of the nominal exchange rate is an 
important part of the exchange rate regime. However, it is not as clear to say under flexible 
regimes, the exchange rate volatility is higher than under a fixed regime. Many studies have 
been done in the past few decades and so far, the results are mixed and inconclusive. The 
relationship between exchange rate volatility is more of an empirical question than a 
theoretical question because theory alone cannot determine the relationship (Arize, Osang 
and Slottje, 2000).  
Theory predicts that since under a flexible regime, exchange rates do not move 
unpredictably day to day. Instead, they will make small and slow movements in response to 
changes in the demand and supply of the currency, as well as any policy changes. More 
volatile movements in the exchange rate will be due to an unexpected change in 
circumstances. The same unexpected change that will cause a great amount of uncertainty in 
flexible regimes would also create uncertainty under a fixed regime that will cause policy 
changes in re-evaluation of the currency, inflation and possibly trade barriers (Friedman, 
1953). 
The relative volatility of the exchange rate may depend more with the length of time 
considered under the various types of regimes than the regime itself (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, 
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2002). The higher exchange rate volatility under flexible regimes in the short run may be due 
to short-term movements that are quickly reversed, which is referred to as “noise”. The short-
term movements will start to cancel out as the time horizon becomes longer and as a result, 
the exchange rate volatility becomes smaller over time.  
The fixed regime behaves a little differently from the flexible regime under a longer 
time horizon. In the short run, currencies that are considered fixed may show no variability in 
the nominal exchange rate. But over time, there is a strong possibility that the parity has been 
re-evaluated at some point, which could mean there are large movements of the nominal 
exchange rate. Average volatility may be decreasing over time, however, because the 
movements of the nominal exchange rate are being spread out (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
2002). 
One view point suggests that the reason why exchange rate movements are less 
volatile under flexible regimes than in fixed regimes is because they immediately adjust to 
inflation differentials. A second view point suggests that nominal exchange rates as well as 
real exchange rates are more volatile with sticky prices because it is argued that nominal 
exchange rates are a result of short-term and highly speculative capital flows (Ghosh, Gulde 
and Wolf 2002). 
Opponents of the flexible exchange rate regime also argue that there is an incentive 
for “Destabilization Speculation”. Any time speculators move the exchange rate away from 
the equilibrium instead of towards it, destabilization of the exchange rate occurs. There has 
not been any supporting evidence of this. In theory, speculators that try to destabilize the 
exchange rate will lose money because they will be buying high, selling low in contrast with 
the equilibrium value. The only way for this to be profitable for professional speculators is to 
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convince amateur speculators to destabilize the exchange rate, while the professionals would 
buy at the low and sell at the peak of the amateurs’ losses (Friedman, 1953). 
Destabilization speculation may also occur under the flexible exchange rate regime 
can also move the spot rate which can cause uncertainty among speculators. The level of 
perspective profits depends on the relation between the spot rate and the expected future 
exchange rate; neither will be fixed or independent from the level of transactions of the 
speculators (Friedman, 1953). 
Exchange Rate Regimes: Output Growth 
In theory, nominal exchange rates are no known to be particularly important to 
economic growth, but there are two possibilities for the relationship between the exchange 
rate regime and economic growth: investment and trade openness (the ratio between imports 
plus exports and GDP), which is a result of faster productivity growth. Higher trade openness 
ratios can lead to more efficient resource allocation and allow a faster transfer of knowledge 
of technological advancements, therefore increasing growth. These two possibilities do differ 
across exchange rate regimes.   
Productivity growth is the result of technological advancements and changes in 
economic efficiency. More productivity growth leads to more economic growth because of 
more use of capital and labor and the enduring productivity growth. To achieve both 
productivity and economic growth, investment and faster growth of productivity are 
necessary elements. 
Fixed exchange rate regimes have higher investment possibilities because of more 
credibility of policies and lowered real interest rates, which can influence economic growth. 
However, fixed regimes do not have the same ability as flexible regimes to absorb shocks and 
as a result, put pressure on protection of the exchange rate and distort price signals. Faster 
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productivity growth that is often reflected in faster external trade is often associated with 
flexible exchange rate regimes, which can also influence economic growth. Trade growth is 3 
percentage points higher under flexible regimes than in fixed regimes. Overall, per capita 
GDP growth is higher under a flexible regime (Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf 1996).  
According to Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1996), investment rates are higher under 
fixed exchange rate regimes by as much as 2 percentage points of GDP and trade openness is 
about 20 percentage points higher. Investment may lead to more economic growth, it may not 
explain everything. Countries with intermediate regimes tend to have lower investment rates 
and trade openness ratios, but higher GDP growth rates than in fixed regimes. This difference 
can be seen for industrial and upper middle income countries and for developing countries, 
there is almost no difference. Although investment rates are higher, increases in productivity 
growth most likely are smaller under fixed regimes. 
Exchange Rate Regimes: Credibility and Discipline 
When a country is trying to decide whether to use a fixed or flexible exchange rate 
regime, it might choose a regime that will provide more monetary and fiscal discipline and as 
a result, become more credible. Discipline can be anything from conservative spending to 
relaxed monetary policies. An exchange rate regime can be thought of as a way to allocate 
the burden of an inflation tax. Credibility exists when the central bank is able to maintain the 
exchange rate.  
In theory, fixed exchange rate regimes are thought to provide more discipline and 
credibility, but this does not always need to be the case. Arguments have been made that 
discipline is greater under a fixed regime is a myth. Under the gold standard, it may have 
been the case since all countries were always committed to maintaining their parity. 
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However, countries operating under a modern fixed regime have developed the possibility to 
intervene and re-evaluate their currency (Friedman, 1953). 
A relaxed monetary policy can cause the fixed exchange rate to come to an end 
because it can lead to exhaustion of the reserves (Tornell and Velasco 1999). The collapse of 
the fixed exchange rate could be very expensive politically, so policy makers are careful to 
maintain the fixed rate by trying to avoid pushing the inflation tax and unnecessary high costs 
to the future.  
There are few main flaws with this argument, however. If bad policies under a fixed 
exchange rate result in bigger debts and the depletion of the reserves that cannot be sustained, 
then the costs will become more expensive. Under a flexible exchange rate, the consequences 
of bad policies can be evident through exchange rate movement and price levels, which can 
be immediately recognized and the cost of the consequences are paid up front and the burden 
of the inflation tax is spread out across time, therefore, forcing more discipline in the present.  
When a government spends more than its revenue, the excess spending has to be 
covered through an inflation tax, borrowing or withdrawing from international reserves. 
Since higher inflation is not normally desired by central banks, there will be trade-offs 
between spending and inflation.  If the central bank also discounts the future, the burden of 
the inflation tax will most likely be pushed to the future, whereas under a flexible regime the 
inflation tax spread across time. This would imply that under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
the marginal spending is higher (Tornell and Velasco 1999). 
More fiscal discipline can also mean that there is a higher individual welfare because 
government spending has to be financed with inflation tax. As government spending 
increases, individual welfare decreases. When spending is higher under a fixed exchange rate 
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regime than under a flexible regime, then individual welfare suffers under a fixed regime 
(Tornell and Velasco 1999). 
Fiscal discipline is not necessarily greater in either regime; that depends on many 
economic fundamentals. The point is that more discipline can present under flexible regimes, 
and the natural economic intuition that fixed regimes provides more discipline is not always 
the case as previously thought.  
Fixed exchange rate regimes have also been argued to provide more credibility 
because of non-inflationary monetary policy, which is known to reduce the time 
inconsistency problem. Barro and Gordon (1983) use the case that a central bank will use 
discretionary monetary policy to create surprise inflation as a way to reduce the 
unemployment rate. A decrease in real wages, therefore increases employment and 
additionally output in. They argued the unemployment rate will not change because under 
rational expectations, the outcome will be a higher inflation rate. Since the workers are 
expecting higher inflation from the central bank, they will demand higher wages to 
compensate. In order to correct the time inconsistency problem, an effective, pre-commitment 
device or monetary rule is needed (Bordo, 2003). If there is no effective device or constraint 
in place, then the commitment of the central bank will not be credible, making it worthless 
(Edwards, 1991).  
The choice of an exchange rate regime could also be based on the concept of a 
nominal anchor in order to achieve credibility. In countries with high inflation, fixing the 
currency to a country with low inflation is seen as a pre-commitment device to anchor 
inflation expectations to reduce the time inconsistency problem (Bordo, 2003). It works if the 
central bank can credibly commit to low inflation. Under rational expectations, workers 
would build their wage demands around the lower expected inflation rate, making a low 
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inflation equilibrium. Although welfare increases with lower inflation, there is still a trade-off 
between higher credibility and the lowered ability to absorb shocks. 
Using an inflation anchor does not stop the central bank from creating surprise 
inflation however, but it does place a constraint on the ability of the central bank to create 
surprise inflation. Normally, the political costs to exit from a fixed regime are much higher 
than using surprise inflation, making it easier for the central bank to maintain its commitment 
to the fixed regime and earn more credibility. 
Adopting a fixed exchange rate regime may not be worth the costs in order to gain 
more credibility, however. If a country already has a long record of stable monetary and 
fiscal policies, the marginal benefits for switching may not be worth the costs (Ghosh, Gulde 
and Wolf, 2002). 
Exchange Rate Regimes as Shock Absorbers 
Of all the benefits and drawbacks to different exchange rate regimes, the most 
important benefit of a flexible regime is its ability to smooth adjustments to real shocks to the 
economy. This has been one of the least argued benefits in exchange rate regimes (Broda, 
2001).  If a country has a fixed nominal exchange rate, then adjusting the real exchange rate 
equilibrium to shocks has to happen through changes in domestic nominal prices and 
domestic wages. This can be very difficult when there is not much flexibility with prices or 
wages (Edwards and Yeyati, 2004). 
One aspect that is argued in a classical debate however, is that the relative value of the 
exchange rate regimes depends on the type of shocks that affect an economy. One of the only 
times when a fixed regime may fair better than a flexible regime, is when the type of shock 
comes from the domestic money market. A fixed regime will automatically prevent the 
shocks from having an effect on the real economy. If there is a positive demand shock, the 
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central bank will buy foreign reserves in order to prevent an appreciation of the domestic 
currency, while the money supply increases and real output has not been changed. To reduce 
the money demand so that it is back to the same unchanged level of real money supply, under 
a flexible regime, income needs to fall (Borda, 2001).  
A negative real shock such as the export demand should fall and domestic prices are 
sticky, then there will be depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The depreciation of the 
exchange rate will then cause relative prices of tradable goods to decline while demand has 
fallen, moderately offsets the affects of the negative shock. In addition, the domestic price for 
exported goods increases due to the depreciation of the domestic currency while the foreign 
price has fallen; which also offsets the negative shocks (Borda, 2001). 
Under a fixed regime, pegs have to deal with the negative real shocks because the 
adjustment period is much longer than under a flexible regime. Employment rates can also 
decline because the central bank has to avoid currency depreciation that would otherwise 
occur by using foreign currency to purchase domestic currency.  
Flexible regimes can adjust to real negative shocks more smoothly because 
independent monetary policy can be practiced. Whenever the central bank feels a necessity to 
intervene for a crisis intervention, it can do so by using monetary expansion. Under a fixed 
regime, this is not possible because introducing money into circulation would cause an 
outflow of reserves and leave output unchanged (Borda, 2001). 
As Edwards and Yeyati (2004), as well as Borda (2001) showed, flexible exchange 
rates do help absorb the effects of terms of trade shock for both industrial and emerging 
countries. 
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Classification Approaches of Regimes 
With any empirical study of exchange rate regimes, classification approaches are a 
major issue. There are two types of approaches- de jure and de facto classification. Each year 
the IMF publishes their Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions where 
each member country has declared what type of regime they intend to use. In theory, a fixed 
exchange rate means that the value of the currency does not vary much, if at all. However, in 
practice, what a central bank intends to do does not always happen. As a result, this is the 
reason why there are two classification approaches.  
The de jure classification approach is the publically announced intentions of each 
member country. In an empirical study, using this approach shows the importance of 
signaling and expectations. But expectations about the regime are not always met. For 
example, a country announces that it will fix its currency at a certain rate, but has re-
evaluated it a number of times throughout the year to accommodate independent monetary 
policy and the implemented polices are not in line with preserving the peg. As a result, the 
currency may not be considered a peg. Thus the reason there is a second approach- the de 
facto approach. It is the observed behavior of the regime. Naturally, this classification 
approach is backward looking. 
Neither classification approach is ideal; both have their fair share of benefits and 
drawbacks. The main benefit of the de jure approach is that it does emphasize the importance 
of expectations in the market. Problems can arise when there are gaps between what the 
central bank has announced and what it actually does. With the de facto approach, there are 
also a few practical problems. Stability of the nominal exchange rate is the most important 
element for the de facto classification but being able to determine why the nominal exchange 
rate has remained stable is not always clear. A particular country is not vulnerable to the 
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same shocks as other countries, so trying to observe an exchange rate policy from exchange 
rate movements is difficult to gather. The stability of the nominal exchange rate may be due 
to an active policy to absorb external shocks, or it could just be that there were no shocks. 
Misclassification can easily occur with the de facto approach.  
There have been many empirical studies on properly identifying de facto exchange 
rate regimes. One of the more famous studies by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) developed a 
method to classify historical exchange rate regimes. Other authors such as Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000) and Levy-Yeyati-Sturznegger (2003) argue that the reason governments do 
not do what they intended to do is because of the “fear of floating” or not enough credibility. 
They tried to devise a method for de facto classification by using the observed behavior of the 
exchange and international reserves. 
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Section V: The Gravity Model 
The gravity model, inspired from a model in physics, is one of the most successful 
empirical frameworks in international economics (Klein and Shambaugh, 2005). In physics, 
the force of gravity between two objects is proportional to the product of the objects’ masses 
divided by the square of the distance between them. If the value of bilateral trade between 
two countries replaces the force of gravity and replace the objects’ masses with the GDP of 
each country, we have the gravity model for international economics: 
                                                       
   
     
 
             
           (1) 
Where Xij is the value of bilateral trade between countries i and j, Yi Yj is the GDP of 
countries i and j, / PiPj is the overall price index for countries i and j, and Tij is the trading 
costs and is assumed to be Tij= Tji (Baldwin, 2006). The constant elasticity of substitution of 
all goods is σ, where 1>σ because there is a negative effect on trade from bilateral trade costs 
(Adam and Cobham, 2006).  The formula is modeling the trade flows between two countries 
as being proportional to GDP and inversely proportional to the distance between them (Rose, 
2000). The variable PiPj shows to what degree trade costs raises the price of goods for 
consumers compared to the price of goods in that and  all other countries, which is known as 
“multilateral trade resistance”. They also depend on trade cost determinants for each 
country’s trade with itself and all the other countries. The gravity model now takes the form: 
                                                 
      
       
          (2) 
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Where pi is the price that exporters receive in country i and βi is the distribution parameter in 
the utility function. Theoretically, this model estimates the ratio of trade barriers for countries 
i and j between each other to the ratio of trade barriers for countries i and j to trade with other 
possible trading partners including domestic trading (Adam and Cobham 2006).   
Of course bilateral trade cannot only depend on the exchange rate regime, which is 
why the gravity model works so well. The trade costs that could affect trade between two 
countries such as distance, colonial ties, language, trade agreements and exchange rate 
volatility, as well as any other measurable variables, are included in the model.  
The gravity model has been quite popular in recent years for a number of reasons, 
being used in dozens or studies in international economics. Knowing what trade flows are is 
an important, because it is key factor in many economic relationships. Data needed to 
conduct studies has become easily available and the gravity model has been successful in a 
number of papers (Baldwin, 2006). The gravity model has been successful both theoretically 
and empirically. 
Like any model in economics, there are a couple of major flaws with the gravity 
model that need to be addressed when using it in an empirical study. It is possible that in a 
data set, the nominal trade values are not properly deflated by the US aggregate price index. 
Because inflation rates are often global trends, this creates a small problem estimating with 
the gravity model. Including terms that have not been deflated can create a bias through 
spurious correlations. This bias can be easily corrected by including year dummies in the 
regression. As Baldwin and Taglioni show in their paper “Gravity for Dummies and 
Dummies for Gravity Equations” (2006), including time dummies in the regression will give 
the same estimation results as not having wrongly deflating the nominal trade values.  
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The second considerable problem that often occurs when estimating with the gravity 
model is that there is a “gravitational un-constant”. In other words, the omitted variables in 
the regression could be correlated with the cost of trade variable. This correlation will cause a 
bias in the estimation of the trade costs and all of its determinants (Baldwin, 2006).  
 The gravitational un-constant can also be easily fixed by including time invariant 
nation dummies. According to Baldwin (2006), adding nation dummies eliminates most of 
the cross section bias in two steps. In the first step, the left hand variable is regressed on the 
time invariant nation dummies. In the second step, the residuals from the regression are then 
regressed on the right hand variables such as distance and the joint real GDP. In the first step, 
the gravitational un-constant will be completely removed, however, in the second step, some 
bias will still remain in the exchange rate regime dummy variable because of the omitted 
variables in bilateral trade. 
Time invariant nation dummies may not be enough to eliminate the gravitational un-
constant in the gravity model because in panel data, time series bias is not eliminated. Since 
panel data is used more frequently than cross section data, problems may still arise because 
the omitted variables have elements that may vary year to year. When this is not addressed 
and the gravitational un-constant is included, then only part of the bias will be eliminated. 
Since exchange rate regimes are not constant over time and are assumed to have an effect on 
bilateral trade, then the gravitational un-constant and the exchange rate regime dummy 
variable will be correlated. 
A second approach to correct the gravitational un-constant problem is to include time 
invariant country pair dummies in the regression. But since the number of country pair 
dummies will equal the number of observations with cross section data, this method is not 
possible. With panel data, having country pair dummies is not necessary anyway, and the 
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method that will work is the classic fixed effects estimation. Most of the bias that stems from 
the correlation between the omitted and included variables will be eliminated. 
Even though the gravity model is normally estimated where bilateral trade costs 
determinants often vary over time, using time variant nation and country pair dummies will 
not eliminate the bias. This is because those time varying determinants of bilateral trade are 
also not observable term (Baldwin, 2006).  
Overall, the Gravity Model is an appropriate method to estimate how all of the trade 
determinants including the exchange rate regime affect trade flows between countries. In the 
following section, I will take about my model and the variables used. 
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Section VI: Model 
The OLS regression model used: 
                                                                      
                                                         
                                  
                
                               
Where:  
With i and j denoting countries, t for time and: 
o Xij    is the value of bilateral trade 
o YiYj is real GDP 
o YiYj/Popi Popj is real GDP/capita 
o Dist.ij  is  distance between  countries 
o Comlangij is if there is a common language between countries 
o Borderij if countries share a border 
o Regionalij if countries share a trade agreement 
o Comcolij if countries share a common colony 
o Colonialij if country i colonized  country j or vice versa 
o sddij Exchange rate volatility 
o Fix_float dummy for exchange rate regime 
o USA and Japan are nation dummies 
o Year dummies from 1975-1990 
 
The data ranges from the years 1970-1990, which spans five different years (1970, 1975, 
1980, 1985 and 1990) and includes 172 countries, territories and dependencies. Former 
communist countries were removed from the data set due to either a lack of data before 1990 
or unreliable data. The variables for bilateral trade, real GDP, real GDP per capita, distance, 
common language, border, trade agreements, colonial ties and exchange rate volatility come 
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from Rose (2000). He collected the trade data from World Trade Database, The Penn World 
Table and data from the World Banks’ World Development Indicator for real GDP per capita, 
and the remaining variables from the CIA World Fact Book. The trade agreements included 
in the regional dummy variable are EEC/EC; the Canada/US FTA; EFTA; the Australia/New 
Zealand closer economic relationship; the Israel/US FTA; ASEAN; CACM; PATCRA; 
CARICOM; SPARTECA; and Cartagena Agreement, which were all also obtained from the 
WTO. 
 The exchange rate volatility between countries i and j at time t was measured by 
estimating the standard deviation of the first difference of the monthly natural logarithm of 
the nominal bilateral exchange rate in the five years preceding time t (Rose, 2000).   
Most information concerning the exchange rate regimes comes from the official de 
Jure classification that is published by the IMF in their Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. This study includes data on exchange rate regimes 
that was collected from Reinhart and Rogoff, (2002), because they also included a detailed 
history of the exchange rate regime from each country going back to 1970. I used a coarse 
classification system where either the country has a fixed or flexible regime even though 
there are some risks involved. Although there is a lot more diversity for exchange rate 
regimes in the real world, the reason for using such a coarse classification system is because 
using a too fine system is not practical for research. Many countries in the sample fall into the 
categories of a hard peg or float, whereas only a handful of countries would be considered an 
intermediate regime such as a crawling peg, target zone or a band.  
 De facto classification was used for the exchange rate regimes. Even though there are 
drawbacks, I decided to use this approach even though when countries trade with each other, 
they are doing so with the information that they immediately have. Using a de facto approach 
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emphasizes the actual behavior of each country and their commitment to the regime it has 
chosen. 
 Since de jure classification approach is the intentions of each country, one would 
expect that governments will do what they say they will do. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) 
checked to see how much countries overlap with de jure and de facto classification. He found 
that the overlap between these two approaches is greatest with countries that used a fixed 
regime, but with flexible and intermediate regimes, the overlap is not as clear.  
 In this research I created an exchange rate regime dummy variable that I added to 
Rose’s data set. When the country has a de facto fixed classification during a period, it 
received a 0 and a 1 when the country has a flexible classification. Then in Stata, I combined 
the two dummy variable to create the fix_float variable by giving a 0 when both countries in 
a country pair have fixed regimes and a 1 when a country in a country pair has a flexible 
regime or both countries have a flexible regime.  
 I also created two nation dummies in order to correct the gravitational un-constant, 
one for Japan and the USA. When one of the countries in a country pair are either Japan or 
the USA, they get 1 for the dummy variable, otherwise a 0 when neither country in a country 
pair contains either of these two countries. Japan and the USA were chosen as nation 
dummies because they are both large economies that do a great amount of trading with most 
of the world. Using a country with a smaller country would not have been as meaningful. In 
addition to the nation dummies, I added four time dummies (75, 80, 85 and 90) to correct the 
deflation mistake.  
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Section VII: Empirical Results 
To be able to determine the effect of the exchange rate regime on international trade, I 
start with a baseline model, which measure bilateral trade flows on the variables log of real 
GDP, log of real GDP per capita, common language, common colony, border, log of distance, 
regional trade agreement, exchange rate volatility, and if either country was colonized by the 
other, along with the time dummies. The first table presented is the results from this 
estimation without fixed effects. 
Table 7.1 Baseline Estimations without Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t|   
  
Real GDP 
0.7961176 140.83 0.00 
Observations: 22,142 R²: 0.63 
-0.0056532     
Real GDP/Capita 
0.6620718 60.95 0.00 
  0.0108624     
  
Common Language 
0.4215124 10.33 0.00 
  0.0408139     
  
Common Colony 
0.6865874 13.22 0.00 
  0.0519167     
  
Border 
0.4728639 5.00 0.00 
  0.0945327     
  
Distance 
-1.124007 -57.58 0.00 
  0.019521     
  
Regional  
1.110132 11.18 0.00 
  0.0993288     
  
Exchange Rate Volatility 
-0.0175529 -7.68 0.00 
  0.0022858     
  
Colonized 
2.264964 20.04 0.00 
  0.1130405     
  
Year 75 
-0.1628176 -3.62 0.00 
  0.0450346     
  
Year 80 
-0.5421532 -12.31 0.00 
  0.0440343     
  
Year 85 
-1.279792 -28.79 0.00 
  0.0444541     
  
Year 90 
-1.441645 -29.62 0.00 
  0.0486716     
  
Constant 
-18.85013 -74.82 0.00 
  0.2519257     
  
39 | P a g e  
 
The results from the first regression are not too surprising and are in line with 
traditional economic intuition. The variables that one would expect to increase trade such as 
sharing colonial ties, a common language, having a regional trade agreement and sharing a 
border all have significant positive coefficients. Higher GDP and higher GDP per capita also 
increase trade less than proportionately. Countries trade less when there is a greater distance 
between them as well as when there is more exchange rate volatility.  
In the next estimation, I apply the country fixed effects using the same variables 
above and the results are presented in table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Baseline Estimation with Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Real GDP 
1.239457 13.61 0.00 
(0.0910799)     
Real GDP/Capita 
-0.0580832 -0.66 0.508 
(0.0877567)     
Regional Trade Agreement 
0.110164 0.89 0.375 
(0.124302)     
Exchange Rate Volatility 
-0.0032668 -1.74 0.082 
(0.0018771)     
Year 75 
-0.1769884 -4.92 0.00 
(0.0360076)     
Year 80 
-0.5220563 -9.82 0.00 
(0.0531878)     
Year 85 
-1.30965 -19.42 0.00 
(0.0674294)     
Year 90 
-1.465122 -17.07 0.00 
(0.0858252)     
Constant 
-31.4281 -16.26 0.00 
(1.932707)     
Observations: 22,142       
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As with any fixed effects estimation, the time invariant variables are dropped out. 
Like in the previous estimation, real GDP has a positive coefficient and is highly significant, 
which still is a part of conventional wisdom that higher income countries trade more. 
Exchange rate volatility is still negative, but is highly insignificant. 
 One of the main differences between the estimation with and without fixed effects is 
that real GDP per capita variable has now a negative coefficient, although it is also highly 
insignificant. The variable for a regional trade agreement is still positive however it has 
become highly insignificant. 
In the following estimations, I now add the dummy variable for the exchange rate 
regime to the model stated above, along with the two nation dummies to correct the 
gravitational un-constant. For each country pair, if at least one of the countries uses a fixed 
exchange rate, the dummy variable is assigned a 0. If at least one of the countries from the 
country pair uses a flexible exchange rate or both countries use a flexible exchange rate, then 
the dummy variable is assigned a 1. As for the nation dummies, if one of the countries in the 
country pair is either the USA or Japan, then that pair is assigned a 1, otherwise a 0. Table 7.3 
displays the results for the full gravity model estimation and table 7.4 displays the same 
model, now with fixed effects. 
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Table 7.3: Gravity Model Estimation 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Real GDP 
0.7743624 129.19 0.00 
(0.005994)     
Real GDP/Capita 
0.6455865 59.74 0.00 
(0.0108057)     
Common Language 
0.4122896 10.07 0.00 
(0.0409363)     
Common Colony 
0.6541829 12.71 0.00 
(0.0514891)     
Border 
0.4707122 5.02 0.00 
(0.0936756)     
Distance 
-1.149175 -58.97 0.00 
(0.0194867)     
Regional Trade Agreement 
1.090265 11.08 0.00 
(0.0984335)     
Exchange Rate Volatility 
-0.0142429 -6.18 0.00 
(0.0023032)     
Colonized 
2.372672 21.15 0.00 
(0.1121989)     
Fix_Float Dummy 
-0.1147464 -3.39 0.001 
(0.0338408)     
Japan Dummy 
1.587195 18.31 0.00 
(0.0866934)     
USA Dummy 
0.897812 10.21 0.00 
(0.087925)     
Year 75 
-0.118228 -2.59 0.01 
(0.0455879)     
Year 80 
-0.4682952 -10.17 0.00 
(0.0460526)     
Year 85 
-1.192292 -25.06 0.00 
(0.0475798)     
Year 90 
-1.339678 -25.58 0.00 
(0.0523626)     
Constant 
-17.7201 -66.43 0.00 
(0.2667606)     
Observations: 22,142 R²: 0.64     
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As with the baseline estimation without fixed effects, the full gravity model without 
fixed effects is also in line with conventional economic wisdom. All of the variables that one 
would expect to increase trade between two countries like a higher income and a higher 
income per capita, sharing colonial ties, sharing a regional trade agreement, sharing a 
common language and border all have positive, highly significant coefficients. The variables 
one would expect to decrease trade such as distance and exchange rate volatility both have 
negative and highly significant coefficients. 
With this estimation, the variable of interest is the fix_float dummy, which is both 
negative and significant. This can be interpreted that countries with a floating exchange rate 
trade less with each other by 11 percent.  
The following estimation is the full gravity model using fixed effects estimation. As I 
stated in Section V, the reason for using fixed effects is to eliminate the bias that stems from 
omitted variables that can affect bilateral trade. Those omitted variables may be represented 
in the error term could be unobserved political and/or institutional variables that are not 
accounted for in the gravity model, but are correlated with a country’s decision to adopt a 
particular exchange rate regime (Qureshi and Tsangarides, 2010). 
 When variables that have an effect on a country’s time invariant international trade 
resistance are omitted, it will lead to an inflation of the estimated effect of the reduction in 
trade due to national borders (Klein and Shambaugh, 2005).  The best method to eliminate 
the bias, or the gravitational un-constant, is to use country fixed effects (CFE) in the gravity 
model estimation.  
Theory predicts that with the CFE estimation, the border affects will be greatly 
reduced. However, the effects of an exchange rate regime will have an inflated estimate 
because the unobserved variables could be correlated with the error term of the gravity model 
and the probability that two countries have a fixed exchange rate.  
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For the purpose of estimating the effect that exchange rate regimes has on 
international trade, using country pair fixed effects (CPFE) will provide a better estimation 
even though it will automatically drop out any time invariant variables such as distance. This 
may be alarming since the gravity model measures the trade flows between two countries as 
being proportional to GDP and inversely proportional to the distance between them. 
However, the impact of the distance variable is still a part of the regression and is captured in 
the CPFE estimation (Klein and Shambaugh, 2005). 
One cause for concern when estimating with the CPFE is that in a country pair both 
do not change their exchange rate regime for the entire sample period, then the estimations 
obtained will not provide very much information about the impact of the exchange rate on 
international trade. Most countries, however, have changed regime at some point in a long 
enough sample, so very few country pair observations are lost when estimating with CPFE 
(Klein and Shambaugh, 2005).  
 There could also be a simultaneity bias because a country’s choice for an exchange 
rate regime may not be exogenous, but actually depend on the trade links between trading 
partners. When the exchange rate regime has large trade creating effects, this could be due to 
reverse causality. Most empirical studies from the past have ignored the possibility of reverse 
causality because of the difficulty in finding plausible instruments (Qureshi and Tsangarides, 
2010). In table 7.4, the results for the CPFE estimation are presented. 
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Table 7.4: Gravity Model Estimation with Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Real GDP 
1.208964 13.23 0.00 
(0.0913608)     
Real GDP/Capita 
-0.0239411 -0.27 0.786 
(0.0881364)     
Regional Trade Agreement 
0.1123574 0.9 0.366 
(0.1242447)     
Exchange Rate Volatility 
-0.0042602 -2.25 0.024 
(0.0018929)     
Fix_Float Dummy 
0.1208567 3.97 0.00 
(0.0304557)     
Year 75 
-0.20984 -5.68 0.00 
(0.0369305)     
Year 80 
-0.5735178 -10.48 0.00 
(0.0547216)     
Year 85 
-1.367913 -19.83 0.00 
(0.0689784)     
Year 90 
-1.52798 -17.52 0.00 
(0.087235)     
Constant 
-30.94381 -15.99 0.00 
(1.935649)     
Observations: 22,142       
 
 
In comparison with the baseline fixed effects estimations of the gravity model, many 
of the results are not too surprising for the CPFE estimation. Real GDP is still positive and 
highly significant and the coefficient hardly changed, while real GDP per capita is still 
negative although the coefficient increased from -0.05 to -0.02, which is still insignificant. 
The variable for regional trade agreement did not change and is also still positive. Exchange 
rate volatility has actually decreased, from -0.003 to -0.004, although still insignificant in 
both fixed effects estimations.  
The variable of interest in the gravity model is the fix_float dummy, which has 
changed the most dramatically between the estimation with the full gravity model and the 
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CPFE estimation. Without fixed effects estimation, the fix_float dummy has a negative 
coefficient, but with the CPFE estimation, it now has a positive coefficient and is highly 
significant.  
Any endogeneity of the exchange rate regimes is normally addressed in the CPFE, 
which controls for the possibility that there are omitted variables that have an effect on the 
choice of exchange regimes as well as the amount of trade. When the exchange rate regime 
has large trade creating effects, this could be due to reverse causality. However, one could 
argue that bilateral trade may not respond to a change in the exchange rate regime, but 
instead the exchange rate regime responds to a predicted change in bilateral change (Klein 
and Shambaugh, 2005). 
Countries with higher exchange rate volatility will trade less. But countries that trade 
extensively may have had an objective to lower the volatility in order to increase trade. A 
cause for a simultaneous bias may come from the fact that high exchange rate volatility 
should lower trade, but trading more should lower volatility (Rose, 2000). 
In order to resolve the simultaneous bias is to use instrumental variables in the 
estimation. In the following two stage least squares regression, inflation is instrumented 
exchange rate volatility. According to Rose (2000), although inflation does not directly affect 
trade flow, it does have a direct effect on monetary relations. And since exchange rate 
regimes have an influence on inflation rate, which can impact international trade.  
The inflation variable has been broken down to three parts: a) the product of two 
relevant inflation rates b) their sum and c) the absolute value of the difference between two 
inflation rates. Each part has been calculated over five year, proceeding the sample year 
(Rose, 2000). The results for the two stage least squares estimation is presented in tables 7.5 
and 7.6. 
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Table 7.5: Stage One Least Squares Estimation 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Instrumental Variable Inflation Instrumental Variable Inflation 
Real GDP 
0.0124882 0.78 0.434 
USA Dummy 
-1.246237 -5.97 0.00 
(0.0159609)     (0.2088202)     
Real GDP/Capita 
-0.5272204 19.07 0.00 
Year 75 
-0.0306918 -0.26 0.797 
(0.0276425)     (0.1192514)     
Common Language 
0.3229208 3.23 0.001 
Year 80 
-0.2991824 -2.46 0.014 
(0.1000614)     (0.121471)     
Common Colony 
-0.3269153 -2.4 0.016 
Year 85 
0.5023769 4.05 0.00 
(0.1360512)     (0.1239383)     
Border 
0.0162008 0.07 0.947 
Year 90 
1.795303 13.98 0.00 
(0.241486)     (0.1284401)     
Distance 
0.3387657 7.05 0.00 
Inflation Difference 
-0.0475543 20.03 0.00 
(0.0480728)     (0.0023738)     
Regional  
-0.4736259 -2.01 0.044 
Inflation Product 
-0.0000236 19.94 0.00 
(0.2354441)     (1.18E-06)     
Colonized 
-1.262613 -4.54 0.00 
Inflation Sum 
0.066535 28.06 0.00 
(0.2779768)     (0.0023713)     
Fix_Float Dummy 
1.753544 21.13 0.00 
Constant 
7.410821 10.48 0.00 
(0.0830045)     (0.7069904)     
Japan Dummy 
-0.5741414 -2.81 0.005 
Observations: 16,470 R²=0.61     
(0.2046376)     
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Table 7.6: Stage Two Least Squares Estimations 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard errors) t P>|t| 
Instrumental Variable Inflation Instrumental Variable Inflation 
Exchange Rate Volatility 
-0.0048258 1.52 0.13 
Fix_Float Dummy 
-0.2386963 -6.4 0.00 
(0.0031746)     (0.0375317)     
Real GDP 
0.8379331 118 0.00 
Japan Dummy 
1.44271 15.9 0.00 
(0.0071064)     (0.0910234)     
Real GDP/Capita 
0.722516 57.7 0.00 
USA Dummy 
0.7236004 7.78 0.00 
(0.0125287)     (0.093062)     
Common Language 
0.3602978 8.08 0.00 
Year 75 
-0.0866859 -1.7 0.1 
(0.0446103)     (0.0525238)     
Common Colony 
0.6575998 10.8 0.00 
Year 80 
-0.4041378 -7.6 0.00 
(0.060692)     (0.0531531)     
Border 
0.2130911 1.99 0.05 
Year 85 
-1.101022 -20 0.00 
(0.1073133)     (0.0542556)     
Distance 
-1.234731 57.5 0.00 
Year 90 
-1.288908 -22 0.00 
(0.0214929)     (0.0582799)     
Regional  
0.8235336 7.85 0.00 
Constant 
-20.57441 -65 0.00 
(0.1048902)     (0.3164124)     
Colonized 
2.228974 18 0.00 
Observations: 16,470 R²=0.68     
(0.1240462)     
 
We can see from the first stage of the estimation there is correlation between 
exchange rate volatility and inflation since the R² is 0.61. So it makes sense to use inflation as 
an instrumental variable for exchange rate volatility. After the second stage of the estimation 
is carried out, we can see that allowing for endogeneity of the exchange rate volatility does 
not change the results much from the full gravity model estimations. All of the variables that 
one would expect to increase international trade have positive coefficients and are highly 
significant like in the previous estimations. As usual, variables for distance and exchange rate 
volatility are still both negative and decrease trade.  
The main variable of interest, the fix_float dummy however, has a highly significant 
negative coefficient and has gone from -0.11 in the full gravity model estimation to -0.24 
with the instrumental variable estimation.  
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Interpretations of the Results 
  
 In all of the estimations without fixed effects, the variables for colonial ties, common 
language, border and regional trade agreement has positive, highly significant coefficients, 
which can be interpreted that countries that share these characteristics, trade more with each 
other. Since the data set includes the post Bretton Woods Era from 1970-1990, many of the 
developing countries, such as those in the Caribbean and in Africa were still strongly 
connected to their colonizers. These colonizers still had the power to impose fixed exchange 
rate regimes and trade agreements on their colonies. Due to the “imperial preference”, it is no 
surprise that low trade tariffs were associated with hard pegs and currency unions between 
countries with a colonial relationship (Adam and Cobham, 2006).  
 This could explain the difference in the results of the estimations for the fix_float 
dummy between the full gravity model and the fixed effects estimation. Countries trade less 
with each other when at least one of the countries in the pair has a floating exchange rate in 
the estimation without fixed effects. But since factors such as colonial ties are time invariant, 
they are automatically dropped from the fixed effects estimation. As a result, countries with 
floating exchange rates actually trade more. 
 The coefficient for distance has remained negative and highly significant in all of the 
estimations of gravity model. Of course it makes sense that the further away countries in a 
pair are from each other, they trade less due to transportation costs. One issue that may 
present a problem for analysis is that in Rose’s (2000) data set, the distance variable is 
measured by the distance between the geographic centers between countries in the pair. A 
better measurement could be the distance between each country’s biggest cities because it 
could be considered the center for economic gravity. This alternative measurement would 
make the most difference for countries whose biggest cities are not in the middle of the 
country, but rather near the shores, where goods can be easily delivered.  
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It is also worth mentioning that what is more important to bilateral trade is the distance 
between two countries relative to all other possible trading partners. As Adam and Cobham 
(2006) point out, there is a great distance between New Zealand and Australia, but there is an 
even greater distance between them and other industrialized countries. 
 Real GDP has also remained positive and highly significant throughout each of the 
estimations. Comparing the coefficients from the baseline model without fixed effects and the 
full gravity model without fixed effects, the coefficient for real GDP has decreased from 0.79 
in the baseline model to 0.77 in the full gravity model. Even in the baseline fixed effects 
estimation and the full gravity model fixed effects estimation, the coefficient has decreased 
from 1.24 to 1.21. Although this makes sense since one would expect a higher income would 
increase trade less than proportionately. 
 As with real GDP, one would expect that a higher GDP per capita would increase 
trade less than proportionately as well. In both the baseline and full gravity estimations, the 
coefficients for real GDP per capita were positive and highly significant. However, in both 
fixed effects estimations, this coefficient was small but negative. When the fix_float dummy 
was introduced in the full gravity fixed effects estimation, the coefficient increased from        
-0.05 to -0.02. Although these results go against economic convention, the coefficients for 
both fixed effects estimations are very insignificant.  
 The impact of exchange rate volatility on international trade has been a controversial 
issue with mixed results. In the baseline estimation, the coefficient for exchange rate 
volatility is small at -0.02, while in the fixed effects estimation it has been reduced to -0.003 
but is very insignificant. Exchange rate volatility in the full gravity estimation has a 
coefficient of -0.001, while -0.004 and also very insignificant in the fixed effects estimation, 
so it does not change much when the fix_float dummy is added to the equation. With the 
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instrumental variables estimation in the second stage, the coefficient for exchange rate 
volatility is -0.005 and still significant.  
 Flexible exchange rate regimes have been argued to increase volatility because rate 
can move abruptly, which as a result can lower trade flows. But the results I have obtained 
from my estimations shows that the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows, 
although negative and significant, is very small. In the fixed effect estimations, it is still 
negative and small, but also very insignificant.  
 Perhaps these results are because many of the countries in the sample used a fixed 
exchange rate regime and only a handful of industrial nations were using a flexible exchange 
rate regime. Therefore, fixed exchange rates may have an effect on something other than 
lowering volatility. As discussed in Section IV, fixed exchange rates can gain credibility by 
being able to maintain the parity. The certainty that is provided by a fixed exchange rate may 
help form trading relationships since fluctuations of volatility are not known by nations ahead 
of time. Even if countries have been able to maintain low exchange rate volatility over time, 
it may not help much to increase trade (Klein and Shambaugh, 2005). 
The last, and most important variable to discuss in this paper, is the interpretation of 
the fix_float dummy variable. Flexible exchange rates seem to decrease trade in the full 
gravity model estimations, but increase trade in the fixed effects estimation. This could be 
because of “imperial preference” as mentioned before. Since in this data set, many of the 
developing countries were still connected to their colonizer, therefore trade more with each 
other than other countries. When those time invariant factors were dropped, flexible exchange 
rates seem to increase trade.   
Perhaps some of the arguments against flexible regimes do not hold. For example, 
although fixed regimes are thought to have more fiscal discipline and therefore, more 
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credibility, it is not impossible it that flexible regimes can achieve them as well. As discussed 
in Section IV, discipline and credibility can be maintained in either regime.  
Exchange rate volatility is often disputed whether it hampers international trade, when 
in most cases, firms are not so extremely risk adverse. In fact, they can use the ex ante 
exchange rate uncertainty to their advantage. Then there would be a lack of volatility from 
overall higher exports (Rose, 2000). 
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Section VIII: Conclusion 
 An Exchange rate regime is an essential decision every country has to make and their 
decisions are based off of a variety of different economic and political reasons. Different 
exchange rate regimes can have different macroeconomic performance outcomes. Both 
regimes have been argued to increase bilateral trade for various reasons. Fixed exchange rate 
regimes are thought to lower volatility and inflation and provide a country with more 
discipline and credibility. In contrast, flexible regimes are argued to increase GDP growth 
more than fixed regimes and are able to provide a country with better shock absorption. 
 In this paper, I used the gravity model to estimate the impact of alternative exchange 
rate regimes on trade. A number of variables were used that could influence trade since a 
regime alone does not determine the amount of trade. Even after controlling for the 
possibility of there being unobserved omitted variables that could be correlated with the error 
term by using country pair fixed effects and controlling for endogeneity by using an 
instrumental variables estimation, I was able to show that many of the variables used in the 
gravity model that are thought to increase trade do so and that the exchange rate regimes has 
a significant impact on bilateral trade.  
 Fixed exchange rates seem to promote trade between countries more than flexible 
regimes. This could be due to the time of the sample. After the collapse of Bretton Woods, 
there was a lot of volatility due to the changing role of developing countries and having the 
currency pegged to a stronger anchor currency that can provide stability. Strong colonial ties 
could also result in an association between the hard pegged exchange rates and increased 
trade because of preferences in the sample as well. When all other variables are held constant, 
flexible exchange rates are shown to increase trade in my study. Some possible explanations 
could be that countries in the sample with a flexible exchange rate have been able to practice 
both monetary and fiscal discipline, therefore have gained credibility. Exchange rate 
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volatility may not be causing any substantial decreases in trade as argued in previous 
literature as it is possible for firms to gain from exchange rate uncertainty.  
No one type of regime can work for all countries at all times and there are trade-offs 
between alternative exchange rate regimes. But one thing is certain, nations should carefully 
plan out their objectives and choose their exchange rate regime wisely. Their choice of 
regime will for sure have significant impacts on not only their own economy, but the world 
economy. 
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Brunei Darussalam Brazil Burkina Faso Brit. Virgin Islands 
C.A.R. Cameroon Canada Burundi 
Colombia Chad Chile Cayman Islands 
Costa Rica Comoros Congo China 
Denmark Cuba Cyprus Cook Islands 
Ecuador Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic 
Ethiopia Egypt El Salvador Finland  
Fr. Guiana Falkland Islands Fiji Gambia 
Guam Germany (West) Ghana Guadeloupe 
Greece  France Gabon Gibraltar 
Hungary Greenland Grenada Guinea-Bissau 
Iran  Guatemala Guinea Hong Kong 
Italy Haiti Honduras Indonesia 
Jordon Iceland India Israel  
Kuwait Iraq Ireland Japan 
Libya Ivory Coast Jamaica Korea Republic 
Maldives Kenya Kiribati Liberia 
Mauritania Laos Lebanon Malaysia 
Montserrat Madagascar Malawi Martinique 
North Korea Mali Malta Myanmar 
Netherland Antilles Mauritius Mexico Netherlands 
Niger Morocco  Nepal Nicaragua 
Oman Nauru New Zealand Norway 
Papua New Guinea New Caledonia Niue Panama 
Romania Nigeria Pakistan Philippines 
Senegal Pacific Islands Peru Reunion 
Solomon Islands Paraguay Qatar Saudi Arabia 
Spain Portugal Sierra Leone Singapore 
Sweden Seychelles St. Helena St. Kitts & Nevis 
St.Lucia Rwanda South Africa St. Pierre & Miquelon 
Tanzania Somalia Sudan  Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago Sri Lanka Syria Taiwan 
Tuvalu 
St. Vinc. & 
Grenadines 
Togo Tonga 
Uganda Switzerland Turkey Turks & Caicos Islands 
Venezuela Thailand USA US Virgin Islands 
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  United Kingdom   Zaire 
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Abstract 
Exchange rate regimes have been an important topic since the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System in the 1970’s. Since then, there is a wide variety of possible regimes from fixed to a 
flexible regime, all with their own benefits and drawbacks. Flexible exchange rate regimes 
have been argued to decrease bilateral trade because of the associated volatility. This paper 
discusses each of the exchange rate regimes, and the arguments for and against them. 
Following the discussion of the regimes, this paper introduces the Gravity Model, which is 
used to estimate how much of an influence the exchange rate regime has on bilateral trade. 
Problems that arise with the Gravity Model such as the incorrect time deflation and the 
gravitational un-constant are discussed and how they are addressed in the paper.  
A baseline regression is run without the exchange rate regime dummy variable so that the 
results can be compared to the main regression that includes the exchange rate regime 
dummy variable. In order to account for the gravitational un-constant, fixed effects 
estimations is applied to the model.  
Exchange rate volatility is thought to lower bilateral trade. However, countries that trade 
extensively may have had an objective to lower the volatility in order to increase trade. A cause 
for a simultaneous bias may come from the fact that high exchange rate volatility should lower 
trade, but trading more should lower volatility. Instrumental variables estimation is used to solve 
the simultaneous bias problem. 
Exchange rate regimes are found to have a large influence on bilateral trade. Countries with fixed 
regimes seem to trade more than countries with flexible regimes.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Wechselkursregime waren ein wichtiges Thema seit dem Zusammenbruch des Bretton-
Woods-System in den 1970er Jahren. Seitdem gibt es zahlreiche möglichen Regimes von 
festen zu einem flexiblen Regime, alle mit ihren eigenen Vor-und Nachteile. Flexible 
Wechselkursregime sind argumentiert, dass sie den bilateralen Handel verringern wegen der 
damit verbundenen Volatilität. Diese Forschungsarbeit diskutiert jeden der 
Wechselkursregime, und die Argumente für und gegen sie. Nach der Diskussion der Regime, 
diese Forschungsarbeit führt die Gravity-Modell ein. Dieses Modell schätze ab, wie viel 
Einfluss das Wechselkursregime auf den bilateralen Handel hat. Probleme, die mit dem 
Gravity-Modell wie die falsche Jährliche Deflation und der Gravitational Un-constant 
entstehen, werden besprochen und wie sie in der Forschungsarbeit gerichtet. Eine Grundlinie 
Regression wird gemacht, ohne das Wechselkursregime Dummy-Variable, damit die 
Ergebnisse der Haupt-Regression mit dem Wechselkurssystem Dummy-Variable verglichen 
werden kann. wegen der Gravitational Un-constant, fixe Effekte wurden auf das Modell 
angewendet. 
Die Volatilität der Wechselkurse wird gedacht, dass sie den bilateralen Handel verringert. 
Länder, die viel untereinander handeln, wollen die Volatilität zu senken, um den Handel zu 
erhöhen. Simultane Bias kann entstehen, weil eine hohe Volatilität des Wechselkurses 
Handel senken sollte, aber mehr Handel sollte die Volatilität zu senken. Instrumental 
Variable Schätzung wird benutzt, um die Simultane Bias Problem zu lösen. 
Das Wechselkursregime hat einen großen Einfluss auf den bilateralen Handel. Länder mit 
festen Regimen handeln mehr als Länder mit flexiblen Regimen. 
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